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Abstract
This paper addresses the globalization - disinflation hypothesis
from the perspective of a open economy neo keynesian framework.
This hypothesis proposes that globalization has changed the long-run
inflation process, resulting in a global disinflation. If true, it makes us
wonder about the merit of central banks in this phenomenon. Even
more, challenges our knowledge that long-run inflation is ultimately a
monetary issue. This paper explicitly addresses this hyphotesis, an-
alyzing how different degrees of globalization change the response of
output and inflation to supply shocks. To accomplish this, the use of
a general equilibrium approach in which we can identify and isolate
shocks and openness is a must. Globalization is however, a complex
process. In this paper I explicitly model globalization just as an open-
ness process. Simulation results suggest that as long as there is one
distortion - free market for assets, the discussion about the changed
values of price stickiness measures which would affect the long-run
inflation process is of reduced importance. It is also suggested that
financial integration, and not trade or competition, is key to under-
standing the link between globalization and inflation.
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1 Introduction
Why should globalization be an interesting topic to relate with inflation dy-
namics? In the last couple of years there has been an outburst of papers which
propose a link between globalization and the inflationary process, theoreti-
cally as well as empirically. It would be accurate to say that Kenneth Rogoff
began this debate proposing what was later to be called the Globalization-
Disinflation Hypothesis, which basically says that globalization has played
a strong role in the disinflation process that began in the mid 80’s. Why
exactly? The are several features of globalization that would operate in this
direction; increased competition makes margins drop marginally, but the ag-
gregate effect is large, it also makes it more likely to substitute non tradables
for importables which would lead to more flexible prices and after all, when
thinking about globalization it is impossible to not think about China and
India. Thus, this globalization-led disinflation may have made the task easier
for central banks around the world. Data seems to support this idea. In fact,
strong central banks as well as very irresponsible and fiscally-dependent cen-
tral banks have reached one-digit inflation. At this point of history, chronic
inflation has been practically wiped out and now, deflation has caught the
attention of researchers.
It is hard to rebate that long-run inflation is indeed a monetary phenomenon,
and that it is ultimately determined by the chosen monetary framework. It
is so, because long-run inflation is orthogonal to short-run deviations, and
it is actually chosen by the monetary authority. If this is true, then only
a variable that can affect the very inflation dynamics process, apart of cen-
tral banking, should be behind this disinflation trend. Otherwise its’ effect
would revert in the short-run. And it is tempting to attribute this effect to a
popular variable: globalization. In order to affect the inflationary process, it
should somehow affect the output inflation trade-off. Rogoff (2003) uses the
Barro-Gordon (1983) model to argue that increased price flexibility has made
the short run Phillips curve steeper, which changes the inflation - output rate
of substitution faced by central banks, making it more costly to push real
activity through inflation. Thus he finds a new way in which the classical
inflation bias can be eliminated, besides not trying to attain above-normal
output or his previous suggestion: a conservative central banker. The con-
clusion is clear in the context of this model, if prices are indeed more flexible
then it is harder to pursue above normal output, and the optimal solution
is not to do so. However nothing is said about the magnitude of realistic
degrees of increased price flexibility, and even more, globalization is a recent
phenomenon that begun after central banks understood the Friedman-Phelps
expectations augmented Phillips Curve. Therefore, the coefficient multiply-
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ing the positive desired output gap, is actually multiplying zero. This makes
less obvious that globalization had something to do with disinflation in coun-
tries like the United States or Chile in its openness process in the nineties.
And it also makes it less interesting topic to study. However it is interesting
to study the implication beyond the non-active inflation bias, in an economy
that chooses to pursue an openness process together with firm commitment
to price stability.
From the standpoint of the modern monetary theory, inflation dynamics is
ultimately a set of decisions taken by price-setting firms. Then, any variable
behind long-run inflation should influence the choice firms make or the fre-
quency in which they do so. The level of prices firms set, is based on their
expectations about marginal costs and desired mark ups, therefore, some-
thing must be lowering them systematically for globalization to influence
long-run inflation. Put differently, globalization should create expectations
of lower future marginal costs for firms to set lower present prices or diminish
systematically desired markups through increased competition. The second
possibility is that prices are adjusted more frequently than before, because
of global competition, a point I will address later.
In this paper I examine carefully these features in a simple model economy
that uses the tools of modern monetary theory. I model a economy as sim-
ple as possible, keeping only the most basic ingredients that globalization is
supposed to change.
I find results that suggest that tariff removal has a relative price adjust-
ment process that reduces short-run inflation but that does not change the
inflation-process. These results also suggest that while reduced mark ups
have an effect on long-run inflation, its magnitude reveals that this reduction
cannot be behind global disinflation. The same is true about the frequency
of price adjustment.
I use the framework of the New Keynesian paradigm because it provides mi-
cro foundations to the inflation process. Besides, it is around this framework
that the debate has evolved. This framework seems appropriate and nat-
ural to analyze monetary issues since it explicitly deals with price setting,
optimal mark ups and sticky prices in a sophisticated and simplified way.
However, even this simple models are extremely difficult to solve analytically,
thus I use a perturbation method solution proposed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2004). Next section briefly reviews previous work on the globalization-
disinflation debate, section 3 explains the model, section 4 presents results
of simulations and section 5 briefly concludes.
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2 Previous Work
In this section I begin summarizing the debate around the hypothesis that the
inflation process has changed due to globalization, and the possibility that
this has brought down inflation around the globe. Then I mention recent
empirical work that leads to conflicting conclusions, which motivate the idea
of dealing with this issue more analytically.
2.1 The debate on the Phillips Curve
Over the past ten years, global inflation has dropped from nearly 30% to low
one digit percentages. It has been widely accepted that this trend in infla-
tion is due to improved monetary theory implementation. Enhanced central
bank independence, considerable research on monetary theory and increased
public attention to inflation have made central banks around the globe im-
prove their practice of monetary policy. Even more, exchange rate crisis have
made it clear price stability can only be attained systematically through a
solid monetary scheme that commits monetary authority in a credible way.
When it comes to inflation, central banks must never stop questioning them-
selves about new interesting links between price level determination and other
variables. First because it is desirable for them to do so, since that is the
only way monetary theory can evolve. And second, because low inflation is
a requisite for high sustainable economic growth.
In recent years an alternative -although not conflicting- hypothesis emerged.
It argues that it is possible that other favorable factor could be behind this
global disinflation. It is well known that productivity growth in the U.S. led
to non-inflationary growth in the nineties. Natural output grew, so inflation
was not triggered. Perhaps something similar has happened to the very infla-
tion determining process. Rogoff (2003a, 2003b) proposes that globalization-
interacting with deregulation and privatization- has played a strong role in
the past decade’s disinflation. He argues that increased competition, drives
inflation down by reducing markups and monopolistic power, this leads to an
equilibrium in which monetary authorities know it is costly to push the econ-
omy beyond its natural level (in terms of inflation), therefore doing so would
be sub-optimal. Rogoff (2003a) inserts his argument in the Barro-Gordon
(1983) model and explains that as prices become more flexible, the Phillips
Curve gets steeper, thus making it more costly to attain higher levels of out-
put. He demonstrates that the parameter multiplying the output wedge in
the Barro Gordon model is inversely related to price flexibility. However he
misses that successful central banks that attained one digit inflation in the
nineties had already abandoned pursuing this output wedge before globaliza-
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tion began a generalized phenomenon. Therefore he is right in his conclusion
about the possibility of a steeper Phillips Curve, however it is not clear how
this affects inflation in an economy that does not try to attain above-natural
output, through systematically expansive monetary policy. This paper seeks
to analyze this relation, assuming the model economy does not try to attain
a wedge between effective and natural output.
An eloquent answer to Rogoff’s idea was proposed by Ball (2006). He argues
that globalization has not reduced the long-run level of inflation, nor has it
affected the structure of inflation dynamics. Ball performs analysis to test
if the Phillips Curve has actually gotten steeper. He finds that the Phillips
Curve in the United States has indeed changed, but in the opposite direction.
His estimates are similar to those of Kohn (2006) and he proposes that we
should be talking about a flattened Phillips Curve, not a steeper one. In the
case of Chile, Ce´spedes and Soto (2007) find that price rigidity has increased
in recent years, and that price indexation to past inflation has decreased.
They attribute this finding (flattened Phillips Curve) to increased credibility
on Central Bank of Chile’s commitment to price stability. Furthermore, Gal´ı
et al.(2005) estimate New Keynesian Phillips curves relating inflation to real
marginal cost and inflation expectations for the United States. They find
robust results on their estimations and no evidence of structural change.
Thus, who should we believe? Even though Phillips Curves estimations is
a common exercise, it is hard to do so; because after all, it entails trying
to identify one side of the process that ultimately determines output and
inflation. The other component being Aggregate Demand or the Dynamic
IS. Even more, the task only gets harder if we consider that this relations
vary with productivity shocks. Imagine, for example, aggregate demand is
fixed, and the Phillips Curve slope makes it almost vertical; then, if several
and large enough productivity shocks move natural output, data would show
a group of observations around a determined level of inflation, and estimates
of Phillips Curves would suggest a flattened relationship.
Given the uncertainty of the real Data Generating Process, it is hard to tell
which estimates are correct1. This is the basic reason of choosing a more
analytical framework to analyze the extend to which globalization can affect
inflation and output dynamics.
In section 4 I examine analytically diverse channels through which global-
ization could affect the output-inflation trade-off sufficiently to explain the
global disinflation phenomenon. I discuss the role of mark ups, competition,
1It is worth mentioning, however, that evidence that supports an unchanged or flattened
PC uses more sophisticated econometric techniques that deal with simultaneity. However,
natural level of output remains unknown. On the other hand, a steeper PC seems more
plausible theoretically.
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price flexibility and tariff removal as possible sources for this phenomenon.
Thus it is important to make a few comments on the output-inflation trade-
off (if it exists at all) which I do next.
2.2 Choosing (non) neutrality of money
The Keynesian economics development during the 80’s was an attempt to
provide micro foundations to key Keynesian features and assumptions. Mod-
els in this literature suggest non-neutrality of money. Menu Costs, Staggered
Contracts, and other models were widely studied to explain money short run
non-neutrality. However these models were static and made no connection
with other features of the economy. On the other hand, the Real Business
Cycle literature emphasized the irrelevance of monetary policy and proposed
technology as the main source of economic fluctuation. Money could be in-
cluded but it remained neutral. The New Keynesian counter revolution was
a natural result of this lines of research. NK models emphasize the role of
price setting and money non-neutrality adopting the RBC methodology.
As mentioned before, the debate on the effects of globalization on inflation
process has focused attention in key structural parameters of the New Key-
nesian Framework, this it is natural to use it to examine such propositions.
Real Business Cycle work has been previously done for Chile, worthy exam-
ples are Duncan (2005) and Ochoa and Valenzuela (2005). Models in this
literature included money, but it remained neutral. This is a natural result of
including a Sidrausky-type utility function and no nominal rigidities. Indeter-
minacy of price level is also a characteristic of this type of models. Woodford
(2003) makes an excellent analogy for the price level indeterminacy. He says
that in the classical growth model, real variables can be thought of as a pen-
dulum, which after shocks returns to the initial steady state level; however,
nominal variables can be thought of as a cylinder that once moved, can reach
an indeterminate new steady state.
In this paper it is important to take features of the New Keynesian literature.
Otherwise, it would not be feasible to asses the variables that are supposed
to be changing the inflationary process. The choice of this framework, is a
methodological decision. Nevertheless, the trade-off between inflation and
output remains a relevant topic of discussion for Business Cycle Theorists.
Notice that it is impossible to relate monetary policy and the business cycle
unless we admit the existence of a trade-off. Furthermore, recent research
claims to have stable relationships between inflation, expectations and real
activity. In this paper I choose to include several features of the New Key-
nesian framework as well as features of perfectly competitive markets. Next
section gives details on the model.
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3 The Model
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to be used has to explic-
itly consider several features in the transmission mechanism of the monetary
policy. I model the Chilean economy as stationary. It is not difficult to show
that results are not different from those obtained from a model with trend
exogenous growth, since we can always de-trend the equilibrium paths of en-
dogenous variables. Furthermore, Chilean growth dynamics are more likely
to to be consistent with deterministic trends, and thus exogenous growth
models, as shown by Chumacero and Fuentes (2006). Besides, there is no
reason to think that trend growth has a relation with inflation, since if there
is any relation at all between these, we should suspect inflation to be related
to the business cycle and not to the trend. The framework I use departs from
the Real Business Cycle literature assuming nominal and real rigidities that
make monetary policy non neutral. This model also incorporates distortions,
which make the steady state inefficient. However, I suppose the monetary
authority does not try to solve this inefficiency through systematically ex-
pansive monetary policy since it is not realistic and it is not the focus of this
paper.
3.1 Households
This economy is inhabited by a representative, infinitely lived household that
maximizes
Et
∞∑
i=0
βtU(cm,t, ch,t,
Mt
Pht
) (1)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on
information available at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) represents a subjective discount
factor, and U is a period utility index assumed to be strictly increasing in its
arguments, and strictly concave. Specifically, cm,t represents the consumption
of importable goods, ch,t is the level of consumption of the composite non
tradable goods and Mt is the quantity of money held by the household in
period t. Of course, Ph,t is the price level of the non tradable composite
good. The consumption good is assumed to be a composite made up of a
continuum of differentiated goods ch,t(i) indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] via the CES
aggregator
ch,t = [
∫ 1
0
ch,t(i)
1− 1
η
di]
1
1− 1η (2)
where the parameter η > 1 denotes the intra temporal elasticity of substi-
tution across varieties composing this good. Since this household behaves
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optimally, it will seek to maximize the level of ch,t given a total expenditure∫ 1
0 ph,t(i)ch,t(i)di, therefore it solves
max ch,t = [
∫ 1
0
ch,t(i)
1− 1
η
di]
1
1− 1η + µ[zt −
∫ 1
0
ph,t(i)ch,t(i)di]
(3)
where the first order condition associated is
c
1
η
h,tch,t(i)
−1
η = µph,t(i) (4)
that must hold for all ch,t(i) and also for the basket as a whole: ch,t, obtaining
ch,t(i) =
(
ph,t(i)
ph,t
)1−η
ch,t (5)
Remember that total expenditure is given by zt =
∫ 1
0 ph,t(i)ch,t(i)di and if
there is an index so that zt = ph,tch,t then
ch,t(i) =
(
ph,t(i)
ph,t
)−η (
zt
ph,t
)
∫ 1
0
ph,t(i)ch,t(i)di =
∫ 1
0
(
ph,t(i)
ph,t
)1−η
ztdi
ph,t =
[∫ 1
0
ph,t(i)
1−ηdi
] 1
1−η
(6)
Thus, once the demand for the composite good cht is determined, it is
easy to obtain demand for variety i.
The budget to which the consumer is constrained is given by
pm,t(1 + τm,t)cm,t + ph,tch,t + (1 + τm,t)pm,tit +
bt+1
1 + rt
+ (1 +Rt)(1 + et)D
∗
t +Mt−1 ≤ vtpm,t(1 + τm,t)Kt +Mt
+bt +D
∗
t+1 +Υt + Φh + Φx (7)
where τm,t represents the import tariff, cm,t is the consumption of importa-
bles, it investment, bt stands for total government bonds (nominal) held by
households, rt is the nominal interest rate, Rt is the external interest rate,
et is the appreciation (depreciation) of the nominal exchange rate, D
∗
t rep-
resents external debt, Mt represents total money holding in period t, Υt are
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lump sum taxations (subsidies), finally, Φh and Φx represent profits from the
non-tradable good technology and exportable good technology respectively.
The capital law of motion is given by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + it (8)
The problem of the representative consumer can be summarized by the
value function that satisfies:
V (sh) = max (U(ch,t, cm.t,
Mt
Ph, t
) + βE[V (sh+1)]) (9)
subject to (7) and (8) and the perceived law of motion of the state variables.
if the functional form of the instant utility function is given by
U(cm,t, ch,t,
Mt
Ph,t
) =
1
1− σ
cϕm,tcγh,t
(
Mt
Ph,t
)1−ϕ−γ1−σ (10)
where σ is the constant relative risk aversion coefficient 2. Then the first
order conditions for the consumer are given by
1 =
ϕ
γ
cm,tpm,t(1 + τm,t)
ch,tph,t
Mt =
1− ϕ− γ
ϕ
cm,tpm,t(1 + τm,t)
(
rt
1 + rt
)−1
β(1 + rt) =
ch,t+1ph,t+1
ch,tph,t
(1 + rt) = (1 +Rt)(1 + et)
1 + vt+1 − δ = 1
β
cm,t+1
cm,t
(11)
The first equation is the intra temporal condition, the second relates
money to consumption and interest rate. There are two observations worth
mentioning about this condition, first, it comes from a Sidrausky-type util-
ity function in which money is held as a store of wealth, which is simpler
than modeling cash-in-advance constraints; second, money demand depends
inversely of rt
1+rt
, which is consistent to the observation Easterly et. al make,
arguing this is the true cost of money in contrast to typical money demand
equations that relate Mt to log(rt) or simply to rt. The third condition is the
Euler equation, the fourth is the uncovered interest parity condition. Finally,
the last condition relates the marginal gain of investing in capital and the
inter temporal rate of substitution.
2In this case I assume σ = 1
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3.2 Firms
As one can notice, the consumer’s budget constraint includes two types of
goods that are not the same as those in the instant utility function (10)
because the consumer does not consume exportable goods, but sells them
abroad and perceives a rent for them. The production of these goods will
be determined by foreign demand, more specifically, by the observed inter-
national price. Both, exportable and non tradable goods are produced with
a technology that requires only capital, which as Chumacero et al. (2004)
notice is consistent with a model in which labor is sector specific. This as-
sumptions greatly reduces computational work and is not determinant to the
results, since there is no obvious way globalization affects or is affected by la-
bor dynamics. In practice, labor market is important to inflation forecasting
because labor costs tend to be a leading indicator of inflationary pressure,
however in this model I explicitly model marginal cost, thus there is no loss of
generality and simplicity is kept. Importables are not produced in the coun-
try, I assume the sector that substitutes importables for national production
is nil.
3.2.1 Non Tradables
Each good’s variety i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically
competitive market. Each firm i produces output using only capital, ki,t with
a production function given by
ezh,tF (ki,t)
where I assume F to be concave, and strictly increasing in capital. The
variable zh,t denotes an stochastic productivity shock common to all firms
in this sector. The firm takes into account the monopolistic competition
environment when deciding price setting. Each variety is produced by a
firm, therefore every firm faces a demand (absorption) equal to ah,t(i) =
ch,t(i) + χgt(i), where again, gh,t(i) =
(
ph,t(i)
ph,t
)−η
χgt
ah,t(i) =
(
ph,t(i)
ph,t
)−η
ah,t
thus, every firm must maximize
φh,t(i) = ph,t(i)
(
ph,t(i)
ph,t
)−η
ah,t − vt(1 + τm,t)(pm,t)kh,t
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but it also knows that prices are sticky a` la Calvo. More specifically only a
fraction 1−θof firms are allowed to adjust prices optimally every period. Thus
the actual objective function to maximize is the discounted profit subject to
the constraint that every firm must satisfy demand in every period.
maxEs
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + rt,s
)s−t
θs−t
{
p∗h,tYs|t − vs(1 + τm,s)pm,skh,s +
m¯c
(
ezh,skαhh,s(i)− (
p∗h,t
ph,s
)−ηah,s(i)
)}
(12)
The first order condition associated to ph,t and kh,t
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + rt,s
)
θs−tYs|t
(
p∗h,t
ph,s
− η
η − 1mcs
)
= 0
vt(1 + τm,t)pm,t − ph,tmctαhezhtkαh−1h,t = 0 (13)
It is clear from these equations that the price setting decisions taken by firms
depend on the expectation of mark ups, which depend on the expectation
of future prices and marginal costs. The first condition in (13) can be ex-
pressed in two parts, x1t and x
2
t , where x
1
t =
∑∞
s=t
(
1
1+rt,s
)
θs−t
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,s
)1−η
ah,s
and x2t =
∑∞
s=t
(
1
1+rt,s
)
θs−t
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,s
)−η
ah,sMMCs, holding x1t = x2t at all
times. Notice that this auxiliary variables can be recursively expressed as
x1t =
(
p∗h,t
ph,t
)1−η
at +
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)1−η (
θ
1+r
)
x1t+1 and xtr = atMMCt
(
p∗h,t
ph,t
)−η
+
θ
1+r
(
p∗h,t
p∗
h,t+1
)−η
x2t+1. Since the probability that each firm re-sets prices is 1−θ,
then
p1−ηh,t = θp
1−η
h,t−1 + (1− θ)p1−ηh,t (14)
3.2.2 Tradable Goods
The technology in this sector
f(zx,t, kx,t) = e
zx,tkαxx,t (15)
So the problem to solve by this firm (which doesn’t face monopolistic com-
petition) is;
maxφx = (1− τx,t)qezx,tkαxx,t − vtpm,t(1 + τm,t)kx (16)
The first order associated condition is
(1− τx,t)qezx,tαxkαx−1x = vt(1 + τm,t) (17)
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Notice that there are neither nominal nor real rigidities in this sector. In the
Chilean case there is vast literature analyzing whether or not copper industry
has any monopolistic position in world market and most studies tend to use
terms like modest or limited, therefore I choose to model this sector of the
economy as perfectly competitive, facing terms of trade. I assume that the
productivity shocks(zi) follow AR(1) processes:
zj,t+1 = (1− ρj)z¯j,t+1 + ρjzj,t + υj,t+1
υj,t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2j ) (18)
3.3 Government
Government is composed by two separate institutions, fiscal government and
a monetary authority.
3.3.1 Fiscal Authority
I model fiscal authority in a very simple and popular way. Government does
not try to influence the economy through subsidies or taxes meant to solve
for the monopolistic competition inefficiency. It limits itself to fulfill
τm,t(cm,t + it) +
bt+1
1 + r
− bt ≥ gt +Υt (19)
I assume there is a fiscal component that is predetermined. I follow Chu-
macero et al. (2004) assuming the following autoregressive process:
ln gt+1 = (1− ρg)g¯t+1 + ρg ln gt + υg,t+1
υg,t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2g) (20)
3.3.2 Monetary Authority
Monetary Policy is modeled in a widely accepted way, to concentrate on the
issues of the openness and not the rule chosen.
ln(1 + rt+1) = ρMP ln(1 + rt) + (1− ρMP )(ln(1 + r¯) +
ρpi ln(
pht+1
ph
) + ρy ln(
Yt
Y n
)) (21)
3.4 External Sector
I follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) to determine the external rate Rt =
R¯+ p(d˜) in which stationarity is induced by assuming that the interest rate
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faced by domestic agents, Rt, is increasing in the aggregate level of foreign
debt, d˜. Specifically I assume the functional form assumed by Chumacero et
al. (2004)
Rt+1 = (1− ρr)R¯t+1 + (1− ρr)Ω(D
∗
t
yt
) + ρrRt + υR,t+1
υR,t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2R) (22)
I also assume that terms of trade are exogenously given.
ln qt+1 = (1− ρq)qt+1 + ρq ln qt + υq,t+1
υq,t+1 ∼ N (0, σ2q ) (23)
3.5 Market Clearing
The capital market must empty. In this highly stylized economy all capital is
imported and is demanded only by the two sectors that produce final goods:
The non tradable sector and the exportable sector.
Kt = kx,t + kh,t (24)
Notice the relation between current account and capital account: −D∗t+1 +
D∗t = (1 − τx)qyx − cm,t − (1 − χ)gt − kt+1 + (1 − δ)kt − RtD∗t There is
no need to empty the exportable sector since the price (terms of trade) has
been exogenously given. However it is necessary to empty the non tradable
market. Remember that the composite good ch,t is aggregated according to
ch,t = [
∫ 1
0 c
i
h,t
1− 1
η di]
1
1− 1η and that the market for every variety i ∈ [0, 1] must
empty: f(zh,t, kh,t(i)) = ah,t
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,t
)−η
where, as was previously defined:
ah,t = (ch,t(i) + χgh,t(i)) If we define yh,t =
∫ 1
0 f(·)(i) then,
f(zh,t, kh,t) = ah,t
∫ 1
0
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,t
)−η
di
st =
∫ 1
0
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,t
)−η
di (25)
However, it is useful to remember that Calvo prices can be understood as the
sum of optimal adjusted prices weighted by the probability of having been
changed in certain period. Since there there is inter temporal independence
in the price signaling mechanism, then we can have a measure for distortion
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st of the form:
st = (1− θ)
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,t
)−η
+ (1− θ)θ
(
ph,t−1(i)∗
ph,t
)−η
+θ2(1− θ)
(
ph,t−2(i)∗
ph,t
)−η
+ · · ·
(26)
And once again it is possible to obtain a recursive expression to model the
variable st. As Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) notice, this variable is a
measure of price dispersion that is in the unity neighborhood. Sadly, most
work done in this framework assume that this dispersion term can be ac-
curately approximated to unity. However, since it modifies the aggregation
condition, small deviations create big distortions that can seriously change
results. Thus I choose not to approximate it.
st+1 = (1− θ)
(
ph,t(i)
∗
ph,t
)−η
+ θ
(
ph,t
ph,t+1
)−η
st (27)
3.6 Calibration
Since the objective of this paper is analytical, I consider important to fol-
low well accepted parameter values for the Chilean economy. This way,
it is less likely that criticism around parameter values causing results take
place. There are several contributions to real business cycle literature for
the Chilean economy. Perhaps the most important ones are Chumacero et
al. (2004), Chumacero and Fuentes (2006), Caputo et al (2007), Bergoeing
and Soto (2002) and Duncan (2005). Microeconomic studies are scarce, and
is is worth emphasizing recent work by Medina et al (2006) on micro - price
dynamics.
Symbol Value
β 0.992
η 5.7
ϕ 0.6813
γ 0.2187
δ 0.025
αx 0.45
αh 0.3
z¯x 4.90
z¯h 2.76
R¯ 0.008
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Symbol Value
g¯ 1.773
q¯ 0.25
τm 0.02
τx 0.051
χ 0.92
Parameters were taken from previous studies and modified when necessary to
make them consistent to quarterly model. AR(1) processes described in this
section are assumed to have the following parameters: ρR = 0.9; ρg = 0.8;
ρq = 0.86; ρx = 0.9, ρh = 0.9. Most of this AR(1) parameters were taken
from Chumacero et al (2004) which is one of the few studies that calibrate
parameters to analyze openness in Chile. Finally, σx = 0.001, σh = 0.01,
σq = 0.01, σR = 0.001. Next section presents the results of some simulations
and insights that can be drawn from them
4 Results
As I argued previously, I do not use log linearizations to solve the model
numerically. I however, use a perturbation method proposed by Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), which has been proven to outperform usual linear
quadratic method solutions. The equations that determine the equilibrium
in the model can be expressed in two groups, xt is a vector of predetermined
variables (endogenous and exogenous) and yt represents not predetermined
variables. The same is true about xt+1 and yt+1. All first order conditions
can be expressed in a system that takes the form:
Etf(yt+1, yt, xt+1, xt) = 0,
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on
information available at time t. Policy functions, as usual, depend only on
state variables: yt = g(xt), xt+1 = f (xt). Next, I present the results of some
exercises done with this economy. I stress the fact that I leave the classical
inflation bias topic aside, since modern central banks have understood their
role, and even more, the Central Bank of Chile or other commited monetary
authorities do not pursue systematically expansive monetary policy, so the
exercise of relating inflation bias to globalization is uninteresting. What is
in fact interesting is to have a measure of the influence openness can have
in the inflationary process when the economy is hit by supply shocks, with a
price-stability-commited monetary authority. It is in this line that I develop
following exercises.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions CPI to cost push shock
Source: Author’s calculation
Quarterly inflation of consumer prices (includes nontradables and importables
weighted by their spending share in total consumption)
4.1 Supply shocks and tariff removal
If different degrees of openness can affect the inflation dynamics process, then
the same supply shock, everything else equal (included the monetary regime),
should have a different impact on the economy. Furthermore, inflation dy-
namics should be particularly sensitive to openness to be able to explain
inflation downwards trend. Figure (1) shows different responses of inflation
dynamics to the equivalent of a one percent shock to marginal cost. This
shock hits the productivity of non-tradable technology with a one standard-
deviation negative shock. As can be seen from figure 1, it is true that differ-
ent combinations of tariffs can have an effect in inflation dynamics, but since
these affects mostly relative prices and resource assignation, openness has
more relation to the very steady state and not so much with the dynamics
when the economy is hit by cost push shocks3. Thus, the inflationary process
is affected by the degree of openness. The more open the economy (in term of
tariffs) the smaller the impact is on the consumer price index. The relation is
not linear though, since the mechanism is complex. It is important to notice
the differences though. Very closed economies (8% of import tariff) do not
exhibit larger enough responses than very open economies (2, 5% of import
tariff). This is not surprising, since tariffs affect relative prices, not the
general level of prices, that is captured by CPI. Even more, as I mentioned in
3Cost push shocks are chosen, because these entail a “trade off” for the economy”, in
contrast to demand shocks, where the answers is more obvious
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions of output deviation to cost push shock
Source: Author’s calculation
Deviation from natural level of output for different degrees of openness
the introduction. For a variable to influence the inflation dynamics process
it should have some influence on the prices firms set or the frequency they do
so. Tariffs have no relation with the schedule of price setting, and have a lim-
ited effect on the prices firms set. Therefore tariff removal and trade growth,
while having a huge impact on welfare and efficiency4, have no effect on long-
run inflation. Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions for output5. An
interesting caveat is in place. China and India have gained protagonism in
world trade. This has led many authors to say that they are exporting de-
flation and globalization has made it easier for other countries to benefit
from it. I believe this is theoretically wrong. China and India are countries
characterized for having low labor cost which enables them to export low
cost final goods. In the “accountability” perspective of inflation this leads to
cheaper consumer baskets and to lower inflation. However this is a relative
price matter. Imagine a world in which there are no countries but individual
producers. One of them discovers a way to make one good cheaper. Of course
CPI in the near future will be lower, because relative prices have changed,
but they do so until they find their new equilibrium in which marginal rates
of substitution equal new relative prices. Relative prices, however, cannot
change systematically downwards or upwards. Thus the China phenomenon
4Excellent studies about the gains from increased trade in Chile are Chumacero et al.
(2004), Coeymans and Larra´ın(1994) and Harrison (2005)
5Notice that the effect on output of a cost push shock has no linear relation to openness,
since a lot of factors determine the optimal path. Among these, the ratioτm/τx can change
the dynamics of output
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has indeed some effect on global “accounting inflation” but has not changed
at all the inflationary process, which is ultimate source of long-run inflation.
Summarizing, trade removal has effects on relative prices and not the infla-
tionary process. Furthermore, this effect is small enough not to be relevant
in the disinflation trend many countries have experienced. Next sub-section
examines another feature of globalization: Increased Variety and its relation
to marginal costs.
4.2 Variety, Marginal Costs and Inflation dynamics
In this section a similar experiment is done. However, the changing parameter
is η. Remember that in steady state the optimal markup for nontradable
firms is given byM. This comes from the first order condition associated to
decision of price setting.
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + rt,s
)
θs−tYs|t
(
p∗h,t
ph,s
−MMCs
)
= 0
In steady state
p∗h,t
ph,s
equals 1. Therefore MCsM = 1 should hold. In steady
state, no firm wants to change prices, thus M is the desired mark up. As
mentioned before, M = η
η−1 depends on the elasticity of substitution in the
CES aggregator. When η(> 1) approaches∞ non tradable varieties are more
likely to substitute one another when prices change. In microeconomic prin-
ciples, the larger η is, the larger the ratio ∂ ln(ci/cj)
∂ ln(pj/pi)
, meaning the easier it is
to substitute one variety for another.
Why should η change? Recall the Hotelling analogy, in which monopolis-
tic competition takes place by differentiated products that are distant one
another. If variety has increased, the distance between one variety and an-
other is reduced, and the possibility to substitute one good for another is
increased. How can we introduce this feature in the model? By changing the
parameter η upwards. This has another implication. If η is higher, thenM,
the desired mark up falls. ∂M
∂η
= 1
(η−1)2 . This result is consistent intuitively
and theoretically.
As seen by figure (3) the lower η is, the higher the desired markup is too.
This creation of variety is indeed making the NKPC steeper. And proper
values of η change inflation dynamics. Thus, after all, globalization does
change inflation dynamics. However it is important to notice that ∂
2M
∂η2
=
− 2
(η−1)3 and that elasticity η can not change but marginally. Thus, even if
globalization does make a difference to inflation dynamics through increased
variety, it can not accomplish a global disinflation, because sooner than later
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions of output deviation to cost push shock
Source: Author’s calculation
Quarterly inflation in response to supply shock and different levels of elasticity
of substitution across non tradable varieties.
the effect on inflation would dissapear. What is left then? The most obvious
parameter in the neo keynesian framework: θ. Next I analyze its effects.
4.3 Price stickiness and Capital Account
The same experiment is done to different values of θ. This is the Calvo co-
efficient that is a measure of price stickiness. Every period a firm set a new
price with probability equal to 1−θ. On average, a firm re-sets its price every
1
1−θ periods. A very accepted value for the Chilean economy is 0.667, which
means that in average firms re set their prices every three periods (quar-
ters). Figure (4) shows inflation dynamics for different values of θ. It can
be seen that there is higher variation in inflation dynamics than in previous
experiments. Although it is not as high as it is expected from a traditional
neo-keynesian framework. In the closed economy model the parameter mea-
suring price stickiness θ has huge effects on price dynamics. However, this is
not the case in this model. There is a very simple reason to explain that all
previous experiments did not fulfill popular expectations; the possibility of
foreign borrowing. Price stickiness is less relevant when there is not stickiness
in all markets. Price of nontradables will remain hardly changed, however
other prices (interest rates) and other quantities (debt) will respond quickly
to shocks making the stickiness parameters of reduced importance. Figure (5)
shows deviation of ratio of debt to GDP in this model. Variations are indeed
considerable, and this is not surprising. Since prices cannot move, quantities
must move. The shock I consider is a one standard-deviation (negative) of
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions of inflation to cost push shock with different
degrees of price stickiness
Source: Author’s calculation
Quarterly inflation in response to supply shock and different levels of θ.
the stochastic component of productivity in the non-tradable sector. This
magnitude explains the big variations on debt to output ratio. This effect is
magnified by the incapability of prices to adjust quickly to optimal levels.
Thus if one market is competitive and distortion-free, then the discus-
sion about the possible large effects of small variations in the Neo Keyne-
sian framework parameters is less relevant. It is not naive to think that
asset prices adjust instantaneously, as they do in this model. Of course a
proper analysis of asset holding variation should incorporate more sophisti-
cated mechanisms to incorporate risk-premium, uncertainty, and risk hetero-
geneity. However, for the analysis of long-run inflation and its link to trade,
it is sufficient to assume the existence of such assets. Next I present a simple
result that follows the same logic of the experiments above. Notice that from
calibration, risk premium is an increasing function in total debt to GDP ra-
tio. A key parameter measuring risk premium is Ω, the larger this value is,
the harder it is for the economy to borrow from foreigners. Figure(6) shows
inflation dynamics under marginally different values of Ω. The evident result
is that financial isolation (higher Ω) leads to higher inflation variation. This
is an obvious result. Households and firms cannot adjust to optimal values of
consumption and production through financial markets, therefore, even the
very sticky prices must move. And the effect is considerably larger than in
previous experiments. Also, it can be seen that foreign debt will more likely
deviate from steady state values whenever the value of Ω is smaller. This
effect is shown in figure(7).
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Figure 5: Debt / GDP ratio variation
Source: Author’s calculation
Quarterly inflation in response to supply shock and different levels of θ.
Figure 6: Inflation dynamics under different levels of financial openness
Source: Author’s calculation
Quarterly inflation in response to supply shock and different values of ω.
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Figure 7: Foreign debt under different levels of financial openness
Source: Author’s calculation
Deviation from steady state in response to supply shock and different values
of ω.
Notice that the largest effects obtained so far, were those of variations of
price stickiness coefficient. However very low variations on the coefficient Ω,
measuring financial openness, can accomplish variations in inflation 10 times
larger. Thus it is not surprising that the Mundell Fleming model emphasized
the importance of capital account openness without the use of a DSGE.
5 Concluding Remarks
Globalization-Disinflation debate has evolved around the premise that glob-
alization leads to diminished mark ups, to increased competition and price
flexibility. Proponents have also argued that increased trade from low price
countries could be behind global disinflation. A careful examination at the
theory of long-run inflation suggests that trade should not matter in the
long-run inflation process, but remains inconclusive about reduced mark ups
and price flexibility. Intuition suggests that these features should have big
influence on inflation dynamics. In this paper, a New Keynesian model is
proposed to examine such features. Results suggest that reduced mark ups
not only do not have a large enough effect on inflation dynamics, but is also
bounded for plausible values of elasticities of substitution between varieties
in the non tradable sector. It is also shown that increased flexibility does
have a theoretical effect on the determination of inflation dynamics, but this
effect is not large enough to explain global disinflation. A feature, mostly for-
gotten, is shown to be determinant on the inflation dynamics process; asset
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markets. Financial integration not only has a considerably larger effect on
inflation but also makes other factors of less importance. This result comes
from the assumption that asset market has no nominal rigidities, an assump-
tion that is difficult to rebate. The question of the relevance of monetary
policy less controversial in this scenario. Open Capital Account influences
long-run inflation by allowing intra temporal substitution of consumption
and investment. Through an open capital account, excess demand pressures
and productivity shocks can be distributed across periods. The result is
smoothed output and inflation dynamics. Globalization has indeed an ef-
fect on financial openness, and through it on inflation. However innovative
channels are of nil influence compared to the stabilization role financial in-
tegration plays in an open economy. The model in this paper provides hints
that reinforce this basic intuition and gives magnitudes of importance for
monetary authorities.
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